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A.  THE  CRISIS  AND  ITS  EFF!tTS  -------------
The  year 1975  was  marked  by  an  economic  crisis unprecedented since the 
last war.  This crisis affected the whole of the  economy  bQt  affected 
the iron and steel industry in particular; further, it had a  greater 
effect on  the steel industry in EUrope  than on major steel industries 
elsewhere.  Inside the Community,  production has for too  long exceeded 
the real demands  of the market  and  exports have fallen as  a  result of 
economic  difficulties in the importing countries.  On  the other hand, 
although imports have  remained at  a  very much  lower level than exports, 
they have nevertheless been quite significant. 
The  recession on  the steel market  has had the following effects: 
(comparison with 1974  which  was  a  particularly good year for the iron 
and steel industry)  - a  decline in the utilization of capacity from 
85  to  65%;  a  20%  drop in volume  produced;  a  precipitous fall in prices 
of about  35%  in the Community,  and,  in some  cases on the international 
market,  of more  than 5o%·  In a  good  many  companies,  this meant  that 
prices no  longer even covered variable costs. 
Employment  was  seriously affected.  Although it was  possible to  limit 
the number of full-time unemployed  and avoid mass  redundancies,  this 
was  only achieved at the double cost of extensive short-time working 
and  a  very heavy increase in labour costs for the  companies  concerned. 
The  crisis had a  big impact  on  the steel companies'  financial position. 
At  some  points  some  of them  were  losing around 1o%  of their paid-up - 2  - SID(76)2813-E 
capital a  month.  Finding the finance  to  carr,y out  even  essential 
investment  projects became  almost  impossible.  Some  companies  were 
forced into contracting long and  medium-term  debts of intolerable size. 
During this period companies  reacted. very differently from  the way 
they would  have  reacted to normal  commercial  competition,  and this 
helped to  aggravate the crisis. 
B.  ACTION  TAKEN  BY  THE  COMMISSION  DURING  THE  CRISIS 
In the main,  the Commission made  use of the indirect means  of action 
suggested by the Treaty.  It used the Forward  Programmes  as the pivot 
of its policy to bring about,  above  all,  a  better tailoring of steel 
supply to actual demand.  The  Commission  thereby contributed to  a 
better balanced market. 
In parallel, the Commission  set up  arrangements for rapid notification 
of data,  enabling it to follow more  closely the situation as  regards 
production,  employment  and  imports.  The  Commission  provided  a  great 
deal  more  than in normal  times in the way  of investment  lo~s. 
In bilateral and multilateral talks with the main  steel trading partners, 
the Commission  worked  to bring imports  from  these countries into  line 
with  the capacity of the Community  market  to  absorb  them,  while at the 
same  time  ruling out unilateral measures  to restrict imports. - 3- SEC (76 )2813-E 
Finally,  the Commission  submitted to  the Consultative Committee  and 
to the Council,  a  document  on the advisability of introducing minimum 
prices in the steel industry.  In view of the development  of the 
general  economic  situation,  the need to  continue with  such 
··consultations proved.  to be  less urgent. 
* 
*  * 
The  history of the crisis demonstrated that the direct means  of 
action in the  Treaty  (production quotas,  import  restrictions and 
minimum  prices)  are difficult to  set up.  There is no  doubt  that, 
by using indirect means  of action,  in particular the Forward  Programmes, 
the Commission  helped to bring supply and  demand  nearer into  line, 
-thereby braking the price fall.  However,  on  future occasions,  the 
Commission's  actions  can be greatly strengthened if its methods  are 
improved,  in cooperation with all parties concerned. 
Contacts  with third countries did yield satisfactory results as 
regards  imports. 
An  e·qu:ally  severe crisis may  arise sometime in the future.  The 
Commission  must,  therefore,  give itself the powers  needed to take 
measures  to help restore a  more  satisfactory market,  and  to  enable 
undei(taJcings  to face up to the crisis under better condi  tiona. 
Such  is the aim  of this document.  After undertaking the necessary 
consultations,  the Commission  will take the measures  referred to herein. -4- S&:(76)2813-E 
C.  PERMANENT  MEASURES 
1.  Analysis  and monitoring of the market 
There must  be  permanent  statistical monitoring of the steel market. 
This  can be  done  on the basis of faster analysis of the statistical 
data supplied periodically to  the  SOEC,  and could be  supplemented 
by breaking down  data on orders by  consumer sector,  on orders by 
third country and on receipts  and costs. 
This analysis of statistical data must  supply an up-to-date picture 
of the supply and demand  position on the steel market. 
An  advanced  econometric model  would make  it easier to detect,  on 
the basis of the fUndamental  structure of the Community  steel market, 
the first  signs of a  cyclical imbalance  and would,  thus,  provide the 
Commission  with an instrument  giving a  faster and clearer picture 
of the real market  situation. 
2.  Investments 
The  magnitude of any crisis depends primarily on  whether it is 
possible to prevent  an imbalance between the supply and demand  of 
steel in the future. 
Should need be,  the Commission  can make  use of one of the means  for 
correcting this imbalance,  by giving opinions  on the facts  revealed 
by its enquiries,  and its General Objectives for Steel*. 
*The  current  survey  on  investments  indicates that  companies have recently 
revised their investment  projects  so  that their plans now  coincide better 
with the forecasts in the General  Objectives for Steel 1980-85;  there 
is therefore less risk of surplus capacity in the future. SEC (76)2813 
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The  Gommission  oan,  should the  need arise,  extend its ir£luence by 
adopting less non-commital  positions on investment  projects  (as  regards 
the particular case  in issue  or the sector in general)  where  excess 
cap~city can  be  foreseen.  In particular, the  annual  survey on investments 
could provide an opportunity for closer contacts with the steel  industry, 
and  for discussions  on the foreseeable  development  of capacities, with 
a  view to better coordination of investment  intentions.  The  regional 
and  social  implications of projected investments would also be borne 
in mindo 
As  part  of the  forward agreement  bet~teen the steel  industry and the 
Commission,  the latter can try to prevent  investments liable to provoke 
..  . 
imbalances  from becoming settled plans. 
The  Commission's  opinions  on investments must  be published more  widely 
to interested parties.  This will  improve  the  impact. 
In order to  encourage  a  better balance between steel  supply and  demand, 
the  Co~~ission ought  to make  use  of its loan policy to facilitate  joint 
investments in heavy production plant,  although of course ·the  rules of 
competition of the Treaty would  have to be  borne  in mind.  The  Commission 
should also  encourage  such moves  to~1ards rationalization as would 
achieve  a  better balance  of supply and demand. 
D.  CRISIS  MEASURES 
---·-- .-:11- .. 
:Making  use  of the direct  means  provided for  in the  Treaty to  cope \·lith 
a  crisis  (production quotas  in Article 58,  minimum  prices in Article  61), 
is necessarily a  slow business as these procedures  are  so  cumbersome. SEC(76)281) 
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Accordingly,  we  need to  find means  to  cope  with this inevitable 
slowness,  in order that,  when  a  crisis arises,  steps  can 
immediately  be  taken to contain the worsening situation.  As  soon 
as certain key  indicators,  defined in advance,  are  record~d,  the 
Commission  should apply  the  suitable procedures.  These  indicators 
vrould  be  either unfavourable  production forecasts  or unfavourable 
unemployment  forecasts,  a  slowdown  in orders  1  a  drop  in the rate 
of capacity utilization,  abnormal patterns of stocking,  or an 
abnormal  and long-lasting reduction in company  receipts,  from 
sales inside the  Community  which  would  critically impair the 
normal  correlation with costs. 
A prolonged drop  in prices on the  international  market  could be 
taken to  show  the need for  contacts with producers  in non-member 
countries. 
l. Product ion 
Experience  shows,  that  during the last crisis the  revamped  Fbrward 
Programme  helped to adjust  supply to real  demand,  and also  helped to 
check the worsening of the market.  Accordingly it is important to 
gain the maximum  possible benefit  from  the  Forward  Programmes, 
which are  prepared with the  help of producers,  unions,  users, 
merchants  and  government  representatives.  For this purpose,  a 
more  finely-tune~ econometric forecasting model  is in preparation. -7-
SEC(76)2813 
When  the  Commission has  so.  decided on the basis of these cyclical 
indicators,  there  should be  a  greater degree  of compulsion in 
the  Forward  Programmes. 
The  production and delivery  tonr~ges published by  market  in 
the  ForNard  Programmes  should be  broken down  by  the  Commission 
to companY  level. 
The  companies would be  invited to enter into individual 
undertakings with the Commission to the effect that they would 
comply  with  the production levels  given in the Forward 
Prograrrunes. 
The  question arises whether the Commission should not  ask the 
national  trade associations,  during the period of application 
of these measures,  to collaborate in the balanced and fair 
application of the tonnages  fixed. SEC(76)281.3 
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The  measures  introduced would be  subject to a  strict time  limit 
and  would  be  cancelled by. a  Commission decision.  The  Commission 
would  then make  sure that  the usual  rules of competition would 
once  again applyo 
2.  Prices 
vlhen  production drops,  it does  not·  necessarily follow that  firms' 
receipts also  drop.  However,  when  receipts  drop  below the  level 
described in Article 3(c)  of the  B:;SC  Treaty,  this  implies  a 
worsening market. 
The  Commission must  be  in a  position to receive the  information 
on  compaqy  receipts  needed to give the  guidance  thought  most 
appropriate to counteract  such deterioration. 
If the  fall  in prices  inside the  common  market  was  due  essentially 
to low  price  imports  from  third countries,  the  Commission ought 
to give  consideration to employing the measures  required by  such 
a  situation and  ought,  in particular,  to  make  contacts ·at 
international  level  as  it did in 1975• 
If need be,  the  Commission  may  publish indicative minimum  prices 
vli thin the  common  market  as  a  preventive measure  before any later 
recourse to mandatory  minimum  prices as referred to in Article  61 
of the  Treaty. 
E.  RELATIONS  BETWEEn  T"rlE  CO!I'lli'IUNITY  AND  THIRD  COUNTRIES  ON  THE  STEEL  MARKEr 
Since the  1975  crisis there  has  been signs  of moves  by  some  third 
country  governments  towards  either some  kind of worldwide  orderly 
marketing agreement  or an  international steel charter. SEC(76)2813 
- 9-
Because  of the growing  interdependence of the  major steel industries 
in the world s"f;eel  econom.Y.,  the Community  ought,  where  appropriate, 
to take part  in joint efforts by the main producing countries to find 
solutions to problems  which arise at world level. 
There  can be  no  question of the Commission's  joining in endeavours 
to limit world free trade  in steel products.  It would,  therefore, 
be vital to seek after greater international cooperation,  in particular 
to overcome  crisis situations. 
Such  consultations  could be  useful  in ensuring better exchange  of 
information on investment  and  production forecasts.  Information 
of this kind,  at international level,  on the various  companies'  plans 
would  help to prevent  duplication of effort and over-capacity and 
would,  therefore,  contribute towards  a  better balance between 
;.;orld  supply and demand. 
F.  SOCIAL  AND  REGIONAL  PROBLEMS 
When  there is a  crisis,  an overriding concern is the maintenance of 
employment  levels.  The  Commission  intends to examine,  with Member 
States and  the various interested parties,  in particular both sides 
of industry,  the best means  of making it possible to resolve 
this problem. 
Although the  social  effects of the  recent crisis were  felt throughout 
the whole  of the  Community  steel  industry,  some  regions with structural 
weaknesses  suffered more  than others.  The  Commission  is ready to 
contribute towards  a  detailed study of the  economic  and  social 
conditions under which the reconversion of suoh regions should be 
carried out. 
Aware  of these problems,  the Commission is preparing new  guidelines 
on reconversion policy and recently consulted the  ECSC  Consultative 
Committee  on this subject1•  It wili also  inform the Joint Committee 
on Steel of its proposals. 
1see Resolution adopted by  the  ECSC  Consultative Committee  on 10 June 1976. - 10- SEC(76)2813 
The  expansion of Community  aid for  industrial reconversion  .. 
could give  further  impetus  to the necessary modernization 
of the  steel industry. 